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PANEL III: DISCUSSION TRANSCRIPT
PAUL SCHWARTZ: Our panel this afternoon is going to be
devoted to international trade and media products. It's our
great pleasure here, our great honor, to have Ed Baker talking
to us about his theories and ideas as represented and presented
in his book, Media, Markets, and Democracy.
It's published by Cambridge University Press, 2002. What I
want to do is introduce Ed, let him present the book and just
say a word before he talks about the book just so I can express
my admiration of it.
C. Edwin Baker is the Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School. He has also taught at
NYU, where I believe he is now a Visiting Professor; Chicago;
Cornell; Texas; Oregon; and Toledo Law Schools. He has also
taught at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government
and was a Staff Attorney for the ACLU.
Professor Baker is the author of three books: Media, Markets,
and Democracy, just published; Advertising and a Democratic
Press; and Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech.
The portion of Ed's book that we're going to talk about today
deals with international trade in media products. And the
hardest part about getting this particular panel set up was just
getting Ed to agree to be on it, because, at least initially in our
conversations, he wasn't sure that this part of the book be-
longed in a panel about telecommunications.
Now, when I say that was the hard part, convincing him to
be here, the easy part was, once he agreed, because of his great
distinction as a scholar, it became very easy lining up very dis-
tinguished interesting people to agree to talk about his work.
So I knew I had to convince him to be here, and I'm glad that I
did.
His topic, international trade in media products, belongs as
part of a discussion and a conference about telecommunica-
tions, because international media companies are such a criti-
cal part of the current telecommunications landscape. In our
morning introduction from Dean Wexler, we heard about AOL-
Time Warner and Bertelsmann. In Reed Hundt's presentation
as well, we heard about media products and their role in the
telecommunications universe. One of the most important con-
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cepts in Professor Baker's work, which I'm just going to men-
tion briefly, is the notion that there are different kinds of con-
tent. We can remember this point by the acronym DUF. There
is "domestic content" and "universal content," and then there is
something called "foreign content," so DUF, D-U-F. And what
Professor Baker argues, with great skill, is that international
media companies will get us a lot of the "U" part of DUF. They
will get us a lot of universal content. But what they will not
provide is domestic content. And Professor Baker argues
again, very forcefully, that for democracy, it is also important
that throughout the world, there be domestic content. And his
fear is that international trade and media products will only
get the "U" part of the DUF, and therefore, it is fitting for gov-
ernments to intervene in that particular market. So without
further ado, we will now hear from Ed.
C. EDWIN BAKER: Thank you. That was a very generous
introduction. And I'm very happy to be here. The general
question of free trade in media products is, quite clearly, one of
tremendous importance. It depends on how you break up your
categories, but oftentimes media products are viewed as this
country's second largest export. Lots of money is at stake, so
you might guess it's a big issue.
It's also been a big issue on the political agenda during the
Clinton administration GATT negotiations for the Uruguay
round. He said this was the make or break deal. We're going
to get free trade in media products, or we're not going to go
along. We didn't get it. We did go along. But that was only
because of the nature and the strength of the opposition to the
U.S. position.
The U.S. position is fundamentally that free trade gives con-
sumers, gives audiences, the type of media products they want
- audiences in this country, audiences in other countries. Not
only is it important merely as an economic efficiency matter,
achieved through the law of comparative advantage, which is
the general argument made for free trade. I don't want to ar-
gue against that general argument here today. For present
purposes I'm assuming that for free trade generally, the com-
parative advantage argument is perfectly adequate, and I'll put
aside Seattle and the various other areas where this has been
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contested. But the U.S. position is also that this general argu-
ment for free trade is true for media products.
It is also assumed that free trade is essential for free speech
- democratic, First Amendment type reasons. A free flow of
information is the way you provide for democracy for a free so-
ciety, for a free world. So our position is based on principle.
We want to serve audiences, to give people what they want.
And we want to serve freedom and the free flow of information.
My claim is that both parts of the U.S. argument are wrong.
I'll take up the economic argument first. In order for me to
contest the economic claim, essentially I need to do two things:
First, I need to show or argue that there's a reason why mar-
kets fail in respect to media products in a different way or to a
greater extent than they do in products generally. I'll assume
that most people will sign on to the idea that markets are a
good way, generally, to distribute goods, resulting in efficient
production and satisfying consumers. I'll accept that as a
given. So what I need to do is show that there is something
about media products that distinguishes them from other eco-
nomic products.
That's not enough. When I first started writing this, I
thought that was all I needed to show. But then I realized, un-
der international trade rules, regulation of markets is fine as
long as the rules don't treat foreign products differently than
domestic products. So for instance, if the problem with media
products is too much porn, which would be some people's view,
then a general regulation of porn wouldn't be interfering with
free trade because it would apply to both foreign and domestic
porn. So what I need to show is both that markets fail, and
that this failure is exacerbated by, or differentially involves,
international trade in media products.
My claim is that there are three ways in which markets in
media products fail. Moreover, each has a quality that causes
international trade to exacerbate the problem. The first of the
three concerns is the idea of externalities. Externalities gener-
ate a general reason to conclude that a market doesn't work
right. When you have negative externalities of a product, the
market produces more than people would want if they had to
pay the full cost; that is, if their externalities were internalized.
When products have positive externalities, then we have less of
them than people would want if all the beneficiaries of the
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products paid for them. Since some of the benefits of these
products go to people who don't have to pay, suppliers produce
less of the product than people would want. This is just stan-
dard law and economics.
My claim about media products is that, though all goods have
some degree of externalities, the externalities in the media con-
text are incredibly important, incredibly large. And to the ex-
tent that's the case, then one would expect that the results of
what markets will give you is nothing like what markets would
give you, what people would want, if markets were paying the
full cost and nothing but the cost. In other words, if a product's
positive externalities were internalized, we'd get more of those
media products; if the producer paid the costs of the negative
externalities, we'd get less of those products.
In the book, I try to categorize ten or twelve significant types
of externalities. Think about dinner tonight. I'll enjoy talking
to Paul more if he's read good media so that we can have a cul-
tured discussion. That is, it makes a difference to me what he's
read. In a sense, I'm getting the benefit of his purchase deci-
sion. If I don't pay for that benefit, he's not going to make as
many good purchase decisions as he would if they were cheaper
for him. If the positive externalities were internalized, he
would have gone to a few more operas or whatever else I'd love
to talk with him about.
But the dinner account just begins the discussion of signifi-
cant externalities. When you walk down the street, you don't
want to be robbed, shot or raped. The social science evidence
has fairly strongly indicated that, to some extent, violent crime
is affected by people's media consumption. Despite that, we
don't charge for this cost. The price doesn't go up to pay for the
violent, criminal acts that in some ways were encouraged by
people's media consumption.
We may disagree about what this means, but we'd like it if
our fellow citizens voted more intelligently. Well, how they
vote depends a lot on the media products people consume, as do
their attitudes about the world and their attitudes about vari-
ous candidates and issues. Thus, though there may be disputes
about what good products are, what a good vote would be, the
generic notion that we want better voting suggests we also
want better media products. Your reading of the good product
benefits me and benefits a lot of other people. That's an in-
[Vol. XXVII:31006
PANEL III TRANSCRIPT
credibly important positive externality that media products can
have. Or, if the media leads you to vote stupidly, misguidedly,
it's an incredibly important negative externality.
We want less government corruption. Media, an active me-
dia that exposes corruption and leads to some type of reform,
benefits us whether or not we pay for that media product or
not. This too is a benefit that is not paid for by the people who
do purchase and read or consume the media product. So essen-
tially, those media products are underproduced because their
producers don't get the full benefits of their contribution to so-
ciety.
I could go on with more and more examples of negative and
positive externalities. But the general rule of thumb is that
what people would generally think of as good media products
tend to be the ones that produce positive externalities, and
what people tend to think of as bad are the media products that
tend to generate negative externalities. So, we get more bad
quality media and less good quality media through the market
than we Would if the market was properly pricing products to
take into account the negative and positive externalities.
Now, what's the impact of international trade in this context?
It's complex, and it's not unidirectional. But let me suggest two
tendencies which provide reasons to think international trade
exacerbates the problems.
First, a producer of entertainment products who wants to
produce both for domestic audiences and for foreign audiences
should find it advantageous to produce a product that is easily
understandable to people in any society. It should supply the
types of messages, and use the type of language, that is most
universally translatable.
Well, some things easily fit that category. Most people un-
derstand when somebody hits another person over the head.
Sex and violence are oftentimes described as the most obvi-
ously universally accessible forms of communication. Complex
dialogues, cultural specificity, are harder to translate. They
are most comprehendible to domestic audiences.
International trade encourages developers of communica-
tions products to have more of these universal qualities and
less of the domestic qualities. If the universal qualities are, as
some but not all of them are, things like sex and violence that
may produce negative behavioral reactions socially, then the
2002] 1007
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
net effect of international trade is to increase the supply of
products that create problems within a society.
George Garbner studied American TV and found that the
American audience tended to like the non-violent programs
better than the violent programs, but the violent programs
kept being more heavily produced. And what he observed was
that the violent programs could be sold internationally more
easily than the sitcoms. The availability of international trade
led to American, as well as international, audiences receiving
more of this violent program content.
That's one consequence of international trade that a policy-
maker ought to consider. Whether it's significant enough to
develop policy on this basis is a more difficult question. But it's
a way in which the international trade aspect has consequences
- negative consequences. Likewise, a national audience is less
likely to get commentary on domestic political issues if the me-
dia product is aimed at an international audience. Similarly,
such media products are less likely to serve the watchdog role
of media looking for corruption. Not many people in Italy care
much about how corrupt officials in Brooklyn may be. So, to
the extent that you internationalize the content, you'll have
lots of content about universal themes and less about practical
domestic matters. And to the extent that domestic content is
important for politics, trade will have deprived politics and so-
ciety of beneficial content that has positive externalities locally,
in favor of media content that has no particular externalities
one way or the other, or maybe material that has negative ex-
ternalities. That is, in respect to content with positive political
externalities, the market fails generally, and international
trade tends to exacerbate these market failures.
The second way in which markets fail with respect to media
products has to do with the way in which media products differ
from at least some other products. The first copy of most media
products is very expensive to produce. Then, after you produce
the first copy, you can duplicate it more or less endlessly at ei-
ther a low price or, potentially, at zero cost. This type of prod-
uct has an essentially "public good" quality. It's expensive to
have it initially, but then lots of people using it doesn't increase
the cost much at all. Markets have never been viewed as being
very successful at producing this type of product. If I had an-
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other ten minutes, I'd try to give you a simple economic model
to illustrate this.
But what I want to do instead is to assert seven propositions
about the implications of having a product of this sort, which
has a declining average cost curve where the first item was ex-
pensive and the later copies are very cheap. The first point is
that there will be non-production, the failure to produce goods
that are, in fact, valuable to the consumers. The reason, as-
suming that the seller has to sell at a single selling price, is
that the seller isn't going to be able to get revenue from a lot of
people who would have bought the product, but not at the cho-
sen selling price. So the seller isn't able to capture all the
value, even though the amount the public as a whole valued
the product may be a lot. That is, there may be no selling price
at which a seller could produce it and make a profit, even
though the product is valued by the public much more than it
costs. In those cases, the product won't be produced.
Second point. Competition can exacerbate this problem.
Some products with this type of cost structure will be produced
and sold. It depends on the specifics of the demand. It may be
that the demand is just high enough to make production profit-
able. Even though the product produces a huge social surplus,
it only barely produces the minimum profit necessary for the
publisher, the creator or the seller to provide it.
If you add a new competitive product, it may reduce the de-
mand for the original just a little bit so it is no longer commer-
cially successful. But a no longer profitable product may still
be socially valuable to the public - more valuable than it costs.
So the competitively successful product could prevent a product
that is valued to lose out, to fail. Along with this, there is the
possibility that the competition makes us net worse off. This is
an empirical question. Clearly, the successful product will put
out of business some products that should have been existing.
Certainly, the product that prevails is also valued by consum-
ers at least as much as it costs, else it wouldn't have been suc-
cessful. In fact it will produce some degree of surplus. Some
people would have bought the new product at even a greater
price than it sells for if the company could have sold it for that
price. That amount represents surplus that the new product
generates. So the new product will generate some surplus at
the price that it's sold, at its competitive price. It'll put out of
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business some products that would also have produced value,
would have produced a surplus if they existed. The empirical
question is whether or not the surplus lost from the products
being put out of business would have been greater or lesser
than the surplus gained by the competitive product that wins.
In this circumstance, it would be important if one could make
any guesses about when there will be a huge loss of surplus.
What I want to assert is that it's usually going to be cases
when the products that are put out of business have a rela-
tively steeply declining demand curve, which generally means
that it's a smaller audience product, that is, a product that's
intensely valued by some but for which the demand drops off
very sharply. My claim is that a lot of these types of media
products will fail when, in fact, they would have produced con-
siderable social value. Moreover, they will fail due to competi-
tion with a product that has a flatter demand curve, a larger
market product, but a product that produces less surplus than
those that it replaces. Now, the empirical ability to identify
whether competition leads to a better or a worse result in any
given situation is very difficult. But my claim here is that this
loss of valued products is a real possibility within the realm of
market competition.
Fourth point. This problem would be eliminated completely,
not the externalities point, but this problem would be elimi-
nated completely if sellers of all media products could perfectly
and costlessly price discriminate. Economists normally say
that monopolies don't reduce production to the extent that mo-
nopolists are perfectly able to price discriminate. You just have
all the surplus go to the monopolists. That result you might
quarrel with, but at least you don't have underproduction.
So, if everybody could perfectly price discriminate, underpro-
duction and lost social value wouldn't be a problem. And, in
fact, I must admit that media products do engage in a fair
amount of price discrimination. However, they don't engage in
anything close to perfect price discrimination nor do they do it
with little cost. So, inefficient underproduction continues to be
a problem.
Fifth point. The problem of competition with media products
can be exacerbated if some of the products are able to effec-
tively and relatively cheaply price discriminate and others are
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not. Namely, the ones that aren't able to price discriminate are
the ones most likely to be put out of business.
If those also turn out to be the ones with smaller audiences,
that produce larger proportionate surpluses, then the result is
particularly damaging. Those are the ones that we were un-
der-supplying already. The result is that products that pro-
duce little surplus, but survive in the market due to effective
price discrimination, put out of business smaller audience
products that would have produced larger surpluses. Thus, the
fact that some groups can effectively price discriminate while
others can't, can exacerbate the problem with the market.
The sixth point is that both of the problems with the market
tend to be exacerbated by international free trade. Namely,
products promoted by international trade tend to be the large
market products. They're the ones that are already putting
more valuable, smaller niche products out of business. Inter-
national trade in media products exacerbates the original prob-
lem of the negative effects of competition. Secondly, interna-
tional trade itself opens up new windows, new opportunities to
engage in price discrimination, charging different prices in dif-
ferent national markets and further segmenting each of these
markets. Their price discrimination process is served by inter-
national trade.
Of course, price discrimination by domestic products is not
aided by international trade. So the international trade again
works in favor of the "mega product," as opposed to the smaller
domestic product, and in a way that could undermine what we
presumably want, at least in this part of the argument, which
is to give people the media products that they, in fact, value.
The competitive process produces inefficient results.
The final point in this section is to note that the welfare loss
due to this form of competition could be reduced if the mega
products of international trade could be slightly burdened, if
their competitive advantage could be reduced a little, and if the
opportunities for the domestic products could be slightly im-
proved by receiving some type of subsidy. In this respect, many
countries' trade policies make a lot of sense. For instance,
various countries tax the movie imports and use that tax reve-
nue to subsidize local movies. That policy is precisely the way
to get the more efficient results you would want in terms of the
economic analysis. Now, whether it's overdone or underdone is
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a more difficult empirical question. Still, this type of policy is
precisely the type that makes economic sense from the perspec-
tive of giving audiences what they want.
The third way in which markets arguably fail, if our goal is
to give people what they want, is if markets aren't the right
measures or identifiers of people's preferences. Markets oper-
ate on the basis of identifying and measuring preferences only
through people's market behavior, namely their willingness
and ability to pay in a market for the good they want. Their
preference is measured by how much they're willing to pay, and
it's identified by their willingness to express this preference
within a market transaction. Both measurement and identifi-
cation measures are open to serious quarrel. People identify
their preferences in huge numbers of different circumstances.
And it turns out they don't always identify them even in the
same rank order.
We identify our preferences in a market, and sometimes we
identify our preferences in a discussion. I'm telling you what I
want. Sometimes what I tell you and what I do in a market are
not the same. We identify preferences with or without delib-
eration. We identify preferences when we go to a voting booth.
We also identify our preferences when we go to a mall.
Each example can be varied in several ways. Social science
research shows this. I steal from Cass Sunstein here. If people
are given a choice between A and B and they would choose A, if
you add C to the possible choices so now they can choose be-
tween A, B and C, one would think that the real choice now is
between A and C because they've already shown they like A
better than B. But in fact, one of the major effects for introduc-
ing C into the equation is now many people choose B.
How one identifies a preference is incredibly context specific.
There's no particular reason to think that any one identifica-
tion is objectively right. There is no reason to say that the
preference on which I spend money is more real. I go and buy a
shirt at the mall, which I put in my closet and never take out. I
should have engaged in a little bit of deliberation with my
friend beforehand, and then maybe I would have identified a
different preference. In any event, do I really have a prefer-
ence for that shirt? My never wearing it is behavior showing
that I don't.
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But there are all sorts of contexts in which people identify
preferences. It's not clear that the ones that are identified in
the markets necessarily have the greatest legitimacy or the
greatest accuracy. They're all just different ways of identifying
preferences.
Secondly, there's no particular reason to think that the
weighting given in the markets bears any clear relationship to
how much a person desires something. The fact that the very
rich person eats at a fancy restaurant, as I hope the conference
organizers are going to take me to tonight, doesn't necessarily
mean that she values that meal more than a starving person
would have valued a McDonald's hamburger.
It's not clear that the amount of money spent is a good meas-
ure of desire. Essentially what the market does is measure
preferences on the basis of how much money one puts into it.
In voting, assuming a one person, one vote standard, each per-
son's preferences are valued the same, at least in theory. Of
course, voting is actually a much more complex mechanism for
weighting preferences, as illustrated by the fact that usually
you don't get to vote on specific policies or distributions. But
voting shows that there are different ways of both measuring
preferences and identifying preferences. Of course, all market
societies, for reasons I think are very good, distribute many
goods, arguably most goods on the basis of market--dentified
and measured preferences. I have no generic quarrel with
that. But all democratic societies also distribute some goods on
a non-market basis. Your preference in your vote depends only
on your ability to get to the poll. It doesn't depend on your
wealth as it does in a market.
Likewise, various things are distributed on queuing mecha-
nisms. In sum, there are a huge number of ways to distribute
things. We give an education to everybody whether they want
it or not until they're sixteen or whatever other age the state
sets, and after that as long as they indicate a preference to
have it, at least until they graduate from high school. And
some states have experimented with at least subsidizing, if not
making it available for free, beyond that.
So we clearly respond to some preferences on the non-market
basis. When you consider things, these tend to be things that
are thought to be vital for your membership in that community.
These goods or opportunities tend to be distributed on a non-
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market bases. In contrast, things that seem to be less essential
tend to be distributed on a market basis. Things that are cen-
tral to the democratic system - a vote - are clearer examples
of things that are distributed on a non-market basis.
The point I want to make here is that media products sort of
straddle this border. I'm not sure what the democratic impor-
tance is in the movie I saw last weekend, but the use of news-
papers and its correlation with voting and voting intelligently
is very high.
Some media products correlate well with education or politi-
cal rights. And my inclination is to think that those types of
things should be distributed on the basis of preferences that
are measured and identified by means that aren't so market
based, while for other media products, market based identifica-
tion of preferences would seem perfectly appropriate. But my
more general point here is that the notion that the market
gives you what you want is simply misguided. It instead only
gives you what you want as those wants are identified in the
market-by-market behavior backed with money.
I want to hold the implications to this point for international
free trade until I move over to the last part of my discussion,
which is about the implications of free trade for democracy.
You remember I said that I object to the U.S. position not only
about free trade giving consumers the media that they want,
but also whether it gives people the media that they have a
democratic right to and need to have - the notion of free flow
of information. The claim of the market advocates has a very
important element of truth to it. Information and ideas from
outside your community, from outside your country, can play a
vital role for any type of democracy. It can also play a vital role
individually. One of my colleagues at the University of Penn-
sylvania, in the Annenberg School, Larry Gross, describes how
extraordinarily important it was for him, as a gay youth in Is-
rael, thinking that he was, in some way, just out of touch with
everybody, to be able to go to the library and find a book on gay
life written by a pro-gay writer from the United States.
One can also see that, as an American, it is beneficial to have
political information from outside. During the last six months,
while American media has provided shrill, uncritical support
for President Bush's aggression, it's been useful for me to be
able to read on-line media from countries outside the U.S.
1014 [Vol. XXVII:3
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Generally, getting information from the outside, either cul-
tural, personal, political, is vital. And so to that degree, I want
to echo the free trade advocate's position.
But at this point, the free traders often go on attack. They
assert that the opponents of free trade claim to defend a na-
tional culture. But what they're actually doing, what the cul-
ture means, is defending a status quo, which in most of human
history has meant defending or masking elite oppression of one
sort or another. Free trade advocates also note that the elites'
policy in effect forces their fellow citizens to be museum speci-
mens living within this cultural regime that their citizens, if
they had a choice about it, would quickly abandon. You see,
they would abandon it because if free trade is allowed, they all
buy American media products - they buy Hollywood.
It's at this point where I think the free traders don't hear the
protectionists' real claims. Most protectionists, at least as I
read their language, most of the time, defend a dialogic concep-
tion of culture, not a museum conception of culture. From this
perspective, culture is about trying to figure out who we are as
a people. And for that, it's important that we know where we
are, what our past is, what our positions are, what people
within our society are saying about issues and values. And so
the argument for most of the protectionists is not that they
don't want outside content but rather that they don't want out-
side content at the cost of losing domestic content, domestic
media industries, domestic culture, domestic news. It's not so
obvious to me that the free traders have adequately responded
to their claim.
When we go back to the reasons to sometimes favor non-
market measures of the value people place on media products,
for instance measures that people would exhibit when they use
their political power - their power to vote for public television
services or power to vote for subsidies for local media programs
- one can see that there may be very good reason for people to
conclude that what they value, though they want to have some
real access to foreign material, is to make sure that the local
culture and the local communication mediums are robust and
effective and have the resources necessary to serve them. And
so, the very reasons for doubting the market in general suggest
particular reasons to favor domestic media products over for-
eign in international trade.
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At this point, I need to steal from Oliver Goodenough. He
coined, or at least for me, he coined the notions of weak and
strong protectionism. I'm not sure I use the terms exactly the
way he does, but there's a sense in which he gets it precisely
right. What you want is to have enough protectionism to make
sure that local media remain robust. The goal of weak protec-
tion is the robustness of the local media. The point is not to
keep stuff out. In contrast, strong protectionism is when you
come to the border, you can't enter. The goal is exclusion.
That would seem to be what is needed if the policy were to de-
fend the museum rather than the dialogic conception of cul-
ture.
When I look around the world at the countries that have re-
sisted the U.S. trade position, it seemed to me that they have
mostly defended a notion of weak protectionism. For instance,
there is a Canadian example that was dealt with by the World
Trade Organization. The Canadian law, which was found to be
contrary to free trade principles, said, "we will let anything in
that people want to come in. All foreign content is allowed in.
What we want in order to preserve the Canadian magazine in-
dustry, is for the Canadian advertisers to spend their money on
advertising in Canadian media so that there will be enough
financial support for the Canadian magazine industry to main-
tain some degree of viability."
During the period when the law was in effect and the Cana-
dian magazines got the Canadian advertising subsidy, Canadi-
ans bought huge numbers of Canadian magazines. During the
earlier period when this Canadian advertising money wasn't
going to essentially subsidize Canadian magazines, Canadian
magazines had a very miniscule percentage of the Canadian
market. Instead, foreign, mostly American magazines almost
entirely dominated the Canadian market.
Well, if Canadians want to have some Canadian-created con-
tent, as shown by their purchases when Canadian magazines
were getting the advertising subsidy, they should be happy to
have some mechanism around to support it. If Canadian
magazines serve Canadian identity, Canadian politics, then
one would have thought this type of protectionism makes per-
fect sense. Referring back to Reed Hundt's remarks, if there
are really no borders, free trade may not matter so much, at
[Vol. XXVII:31016
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least politically. If there are no nations, free trade may not
matter so much for national politics.
But to the extent that the Canadians need to figure out how
to deal with First World people, they need to figure out what
they want in terms of their health care system; to the extent
they have huge numbers of domestic issues, they should want
to have a media that served their interests in discourse about
issues, which was precisely what the protectionist policy did by
directing Canadian advertising money to Canadian magazines.
So if I'm right, though the United States' position may very
well serve the profits of, and otherwise benefit, U.S. firms, the
U.S.'s principle claims - its claims that we are serving the
consumers of the world and that we're serving the democratic
needs of people - are precisely wrong. Some degree of protec-
tionism could serve both of those much better than a pure free
trade regime.
So I have to say that what I'm fearful of, and what many
people engaged in the NAFTA and GATT negotiations saw, is
that the free trade position of the United States doesn't make
the United States so much an international leader. Rather, it
makes the U.S. what various countries have suggested the
United States might be at times - an international bully.
Thank you very much.
OLIVER GOODENOUGH: This framework comes from the
title of this session: "International Trade in Media Products."
My premise is that we have been making policy, deciding adju-
dications and writing into international trade agreements a set
of rules about international trade in media products without
having very much understanding of the international trade
aspects and even less of what media products are and what
they do in culture. We've been proceeding blindly on the basis
of a received orthodoxy which really needs examination.
My praise is for Ed Baker's book. It is a wonderful book in
this field. It significantly raises our level of understanding of
at least half of this equation, international trade and markets.
As you heard discussed, he identifies a whole series of subtle-
ties involved in the economics of this kind of product, and iden-
tifies issues that really need to be addressed by the sort of or-
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thodox, may I say, knee-jerk free traders. It's a wonderful book
from that standpoint alone. To me, the great revelation was in
the pricing differentials and how this really is dumping. When
I read this, the light went on for me. It should have gone on
earlier.
It's a wonderful book. I do have one suggestion to add to the
economic analysis. In talking about consumer preference in
this area, particularly in connection with advertising driven
media, it is important to recollect that the watcher is not the
end consumer of the economic process. The watcher is to that
process as halibut is to fishing: the product, what is being
packaged and sold - advertising-driven media - is the atten-
tion of a mass audience. You are the halibut. You are not a
consumer. And what is being put out there in terms of media
production is bait. It might be sensible to talk about fish pref-
erences for various types of bait as a basis for analyzing the
economics of the fishing industry. But I think it would be more
intelligent to talk about the preference of the ultimate
buyer/consumer/fish-eater, rather than the fish.
And so my one suggestion is that if you turn some of the eco-
nomic analysis upside down and really say who is the consumer
and what's being consumed. For advertising-driven media,
particularly free television, where there's no out-of-pocket ex-
pense to the individual involved, it might well be worthwhile
changing the preference structure around and recognizing who
is really exercising preference and who is just a piece of the
manufacturing process captured by the cheapest, most effec-
tive, smelliest bait we can spread in front of them.
Disagreement. You heard the discussion of weak and strong
protectionism and you have heard the example given of how
the Canadian magazine rules were in fact a form of weak pro-
tectionism. I am taken to task by Professor Baker for having
made the mistake of suggesting that this structure was strong
protectionism in a piece of writing which you here in the room
can receive for free thanks to the market-distorting influence of
my law school's open xeroxing policy.
I don't come away persuaded that I'm wrong. But I do come
away persuaded that reasonable people could differ, which is
perhaps as close as I'm going to get on this one. Part of the
problem is that if you take a weak protectionism/strong protec-
tionism taxonomy, then I think that what the Canadians have
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done is used a weak protectionist approach to achieve a strong
protectionist result. This suggests to me that perhaps the divi-
sion is not as clean a taxonomy as it would be nice to have it.
That doesn't mean it's useless or it's not helpful, but when we
get into the gray areas near the edges, reasonable people can
perhaps continue to differ on how to characterize things.
What's my elaboration? Well, my elaboration is the need to
address the other half of the framework. As I say, Professor
Baker's work provides a wonderful contribution to the econom-
ics and market side of the framework. And it provides a partial
contribution to the media product, culture side of the frame-
work. The notion of a dialogic culture which Professor Baker
develops is very useful, but still only a partial description of
what's going on. Having an informed democracy is an impor-
tant element, but by no means the only element of having a
coherent culture.
Culture matters tremendously in maintaining social struc-
tures, but we have very limited insight into how that works,
and that insight is mainly expressed inarticulately, inchoately,
through "I just know it's going to be right" kinds of arguments.
And it seems clear that media products matter to some degree,
but to a degree we haven't fully worked out, in how cultures
maintain and sustain themselves.
As we heard, there is some data that viewing violent media
productions may create a more violent cultural milieu. But the
effect of media on culture is still unclear. In the Canadian cir-
cumstance, the one good bit of data that I could find was a big
survey of U.S. and Canadian attitudes on attitude formation.
It's data came from 1981 and 1990. Surprisingly, it shows
clearly that the Canadian attitudes are leading U.S. attitudes
rather than the other way around. So the entire myth of Ca-
nadian culture being subverted at a deep attitudinal level by
American media products was not sustained by the one good
set of data I was able to find. If anything, the exact opposite
was true. Huh? Canada is raising this huge fuss about U.S.
cultural imports. It's one of the recurring problems and themes
in their civic life, how to deal with this destructive influence of
the U.S., and what we find is that Canadian attitudes are
much more robust than we would expect them to be.
The piece that I wrote was at least a first stab at bringing
the dynamics of culture into the discussion. It is an inadequate
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understanding, but at least it's some work in that direction. I
think that what is added with Professor Baker's approach of
dialogic culture is a very useful addition. So, we have a rea-
sonably well worked out formal system for talking about how
markets work and how economics work. And we have a bit of it
for political science. We don't have that yet for culture.
There's lots of room to work there.
Now, in making my elaboration, I want to offer one further
suggestion. A suggestion for a way perhaps to meld some of
the classical preoccupations of economics with some of the pre-
occupations of the folks dealing in culture. Systems that will
sustain themselves over time must be preoccupied not just with
output, which is the kind of thing that economic efficiency
analysis is looking for. A system that is actually going to per-
sist over time, particularly one having to construct itself out of
human interaction day after day, must also solve the problem
of stability. A stability solution is as necessary for a human
economic system as any output solution. Furthermore, a hu-
man economic system also must solve a problem of transfer-
ability across generations. These are, in effect, three solutions
that a human social structure must be solving simultaneously.
Even Professor Baker's more sophisticated approach rests on
a theory of output maximization. The output solution we've got
a reasonable handle on. How societies stabilize themselves and
how they give that stable solution continuity, making it trans-
ferable across individuals and generations, is something we
have less understanding of. This is where this question of the
effect of media on culture is so important. Professor Baker
asks: "Are protectionist measures not just preventing helping
to preserve dialog?" We need to ask: Are they preserving the
kind of stability and transferability of the rule set which makes
the output maximizing kinds of rules possible over time?
That's my elaboration. It leads me to my final point, which is
a doubt. It relates to the question of freedom of expression and
freedom of speech, the interesting question which Professor
Baker says needs to be looked at, not in terms of economics, but
in terms of human rights. Free speech is a value we have a lot
of, particularly in our society, but it is innately destabilizing.
It's not just free economic markets that destabilize; so does
free speech. And while I'm a reasonable believer in markets, I
don't hold it up with the same kind of gut fervor that I do the
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First Amendment. I'm one of those folks for whom the First
Amendment is a given. I think that's got to be right. But my
doubt is that if I'm sensitive to controlling free trade to pre-
serve stability, to what degree do I permit destabilization
through the transfer of information. Because if cultural protec-
tion justifies trade protection of various kinds, how can I
counter an argument that no, at least in terms of freedom of
expression, a society has got to be open and take those risks of
destabilization.
Here's a possible suggestion: I think the first amendment to
some degree looks the same as my weak and strong protection.
Weak protection would be the kind of measure that might be
permitted under the First Amendment, i.e., the U.S. govern-
ment can take affirmative positions about things; it can give
money to opera companies; it can advocate and help. There is
no First Amendment problem with the National Endowment
for the Arts, at least not that we've explored very much. What
government can't do is prohibit speech - which is what strong
protectionism accomplishes.
The weak and strong protectionism distinction may reflect
my First Amendment orthodoxy, having rejected economic or-
thodoxy. How one reconciles the freedom of information flow
with stability is a question that is going to require far more
work to solve than we can give it today.
PAUL SCHWARTZ: Thank you, Oliver. It is now my great
honor to introduce Professor Monroe Price, who teaches here in
New York at Yeshiva University's Benjamin Cardozo School of
Law. Professor Price is co-director of the Program in Compara-
tive Media and Law of Wilson College, Oxford, and has been a
communications fellow of the Markle Foundation. I can also
say that, of the many, many books that Monroe Price has pub-
lished and co-edited, I'm a particular fan of his wonderful vol-
ume on the V-chip.
MONROE PRICE: The framework I want to use is based on
Ed Baker's attack on the two notions that have historically un-
dergirded the argument for free trade in media and informa-
tion. The first argument, is that a free trade model furthers
the likelihood that the media "gives people what they want."
The second is that expanded market based media, globally dis-
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tributed, furthers democratic values. And I think a lot of Ed's
book is questioning whether or not free trade performs those
two functions.
I want to take issue, obliquely, with the Baker argument. I
want to ask whether there is a different explanation for various
goals considering the distribution of images, information and
programs. Baker handsomely attacks emerging policies on the
ground that that they do not fulfill the two major objectives.
My question is whether it is indeed the goal of global media
policies to do either of these two things, or is there some other
goal which is a better, or additional, explanation of regulatory
frameworks?
And here I want to pick up a little bit on the idea of stability.
This is an extension of work that I did a decade ago, or so, in
defining The Market of Loyalties, which argued that, within a
country, regulation is a mode of regulating a market for loyal-
ties and allocating power among competitors for loyalties; or
freezing the status quo through an agreement among the com-
peting groups. I think globally a similar kind of competition
exists, that is to say there is a competition for influence, in
which there are various steps that are taken by various actors.
And that the argument for free trade is a central element of
masking or shaping a particular entrant into this market for
loyalties on a global basis. This has to be seen in a much larger
context.
Now, it's interesting - and I'll use the "since September 11
argument." Since September 11, the U.S. articulates that there
has been an explicit shift in its position on this as in other is-
sues: The attitude toward information moving from one of ex-
panding trade, which was sort of the expanding of the notion of
copyright protection, lowering barriers, among other argu-
ments, to one in which there are friends, there are enemies,
and the issue in the information sphere is how to manage in-
formation so as to stabilize or protect countries that are friends
and destabilize countries that are not friends.
I have housed this shift in a post-September 11 context, but
it seems to me a much more prevailing and important mode for
thinking through policy. And it supplements Ed Baker's ar-
guments of testing media policies against claims of "giving peo-
ple what they want" or promoting democratic values.
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These may also be stated arguments, but a national policy
has to look at national security interests, block interests. But
one issue is whether Baker is seriously taking these arguments
at their face. Obviously, he doesn't do so and recognizes that
these are the stated goals; but they're not the real national
goals. They're not the real goals because media policies do not
necessarily function to perform those purposes, and may be
masking some other objectives. And the question is, are they
merely masking objectives of expanding a consumer world or
are there other kinds of objectives that should be included.
I'm going to provide a few notes from a book I'm writing,
called Media and Sovereignty, to suggest how to think of alter-
native articulations to Baker's treatment of "giving people what
they want" and furthering democracy. National responses to
media globalization can be divided into two categories. One is
the protection of a state's internal space, that is to say, what is
the mix of ideas within a country. This is the Canadian ques-
tion, which is: How do we shape what the images are, .what are
the words, what is the mixture of content within Canada? And
this is a model that we're all familiar with and one that we
grew up with, namely a kind of bubble of identity in which a
nation state tries to shape the images within its boundaries.
But I think there's also a new model of thinking about alter-
ing media space, and that involves thinking of affecting exter-
nal space. Here, the United States is the 800 pound gorilla, but
hardly the only gorilla, and how this model functions is cer-
tainly relevant to Professor Baker's book. The effort is to de-
velop a model or theory out of something obvious, namely, how
the United States influences imagery in the rest of the world
through a free market policy. But the question of initiating
change externally goes far beyond the United States. One can
ask how India or China tries to do this. What are the mecha-
nisms that various countries are beginning to use themselves,
not only to look at their internal space, but to look externally?
Now, as to Canada, it's a funny issue, but there was an
amusing edition of the public radio show "This American Life"
about the secret, hidden ways that Canadians are influencing
what Americans hear, everything from Peter Jennings to secret
codes on sitcoms that are written by Canadian writers. But
that's sort of an odd and eccentric example of this issue. Actu-
ally, everywhere you look you can see such efforts: by Serbia
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trying to influence European space; or India's Doordarshan
trying to influence the Pakistani population. Pakistan is trying
to influence opinion in India. On close examination, the proc-
ess of influencing imagery is a more dynamic framework than
would be captured by looking at the issue of free trade through
the lens of expanding democracy or giving people what they
want. So that seems to me to be the first question.
One way to think about all this is as a kind of information
market for loyalties, in which there is a transnational mobiliza-
tion of pockets of political identity, not only internally, but
throughout the world. Let me provide some examples. My fa-
vorite involves efforts to influence Kurdish populations within
Turkey, using satellites from abroad. Again, this demonstrates
the very targeted ways information identifies and shifts a mar-
ket for loyalties.
A second example involves achieving stability. And this goes
to the issue in some ways of national security. What is the mix
of voices within a state that will create a kind of stability where
there is an international interest in stability, as opposed to an
international interest in destabilizing where there is a consen-
sus or external zeal for regime change. So you have, at the
same time, the U.S. announcing that its going to take a trans-
mitter and place it either in Iran or in the Kurdish sector of
Iraq to destabilize the Iraqi government, and at the same time
a kind of active toleration of a Kazakh monopoly of the media
on the grounds that Kazakhstan is an important ally and its oil
and gas reserves are important. Thus, the U.S. and other
states have a variety of media policies that are affected by a
notion of what leads to stability in a particular country. And
that in some sense can be translated into this question of na-
tional culture and national protection of identity through re-
strictions on media content. How this is done depends on the
structure within each country: sometimes the mix is affected by
free trade practices; the existence of public service broadcast-
ing; the availability of technology; the nature and history of
regime structure; national security concerns; et cetera.
Now, the question then is what's good and what's bad.
Which interventions are horrible practice and which are good?
And there you have to look at justifications for restrictions; the
mode of the communications technology restricted; the object of
restriction; the intensity of restriction; and, in a sense, whether
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national security proclaimed fears or justify it or not. Increas-
ingly, officials use national security interest to either fence out
information, claim that they need to do certain things for in-
ternal stability or, finally, in their effort to affect opinions
abroad.
PAUL SCHWARTZ: Thank you very much, Monroe. That
was wonderful .... and Ed?
C. EDWARD BAKER: I think I'll go backwards through the
comments.
In large part, I have very little to disagree with, as far as
Monroe's comments go. In a sense, what I did was describe two
definitive normative premises, ask whether they provide a good
argument for free trade, and claim that they do not.
What he did, and your characterization of it as sociological I
think is right, is to suggest, well, maybe free trade does not
serve these premises because it's really trying to do something
else. I'm happy to agree. At that point one could look at what
else free trade does. If those are good things, we can sign on to
them. If they're not, then I'd want to hold up as the standard
the normative premises I do defend, namely providing for peo-
ple's desires and providing for democracy, and say that we need
to resist certain aspects of globalization on the basis of those
normative premises. In fact, at the end of my talk I cast doubt
that what's really going on here is not any attempt to provide
for consumers or to provide for democracy, but rather to pro-.
vide for greater profits for various global corporations.
Monroe Price usefully adds, though in different words, a
point that reminds me of some of Noam Chomsky's discussion,
that maybe the media industry is designed to maintain the im-
perialist capitalist order. To the extent that that's what the
"market for loyalties" is, we should know it - which is Monroe
Price's project - and then know when and how to critique it in
the face of other values - which is my project. To the extent
that the market for loyalties can be given a better, more nor-
matively defensible characterization, which it might be in some
circumstances, we should consider that, too. So his sociological
investigation is interesting and useful. However, I don't think
it undermines my desire to hold international trade up to two
normative principles and then evaluate it in those terms.
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Oliver Goodenough's comments - I actually took down a lot
of notes. I'll only go through a couple of them. As to one, I
have to do at least a little bit of advertising. He asked you to
look at advertising media and think about media in those
terms. That's what I did with my first book in this area, Adver-
tising and a Democratic Press. I fully agree that the impact of
advertising is a hugely important topic, and so if you're inter-
ested, which you should be, go read my book. Goodenough's
comment about Canadians leading Americans in attitude
change is right. Monroe Price explained why. They write se-
cret codes into sitcoms. But I'd need a lot more information to
comment about that.
More seriously, the main thing I want to emphasize is that
Oliver is right. Culture is a hugely complex thing. And I didn't
pretend to give a full discussion. The most I did was suggest
two different images. One is that culture is something that's
preserved and kept the same. A museum. It's sort of an arti-
fact. And that I imagine is an extraordinarily constraining and
unappealing conception of culture, just as I find certain forms
of closed communities to be unappealing political ideals. But
that objection doesn't mean I find communities unappealing.
Will Kylmicka, one of my favorite political philosophers, em-
phasizes a liberal form of communitarianism. His emphasis -
and I drew on this in my notion of "dialogic" conception of cul-
ture - is that culture is absolutely essential to transfer from
generation to generation, and it's important for stability or
maybe just survival. He describes how, when the "first na-
tions" culture is destroyed, the suicide rates go up - a hugely
detrimental consequence. But that doesn't lead him to think
that the old cultural content must be maintained. Rather, cul-
turally it needs to develop in a way that's by and large inter-
nally controlled and discourse controlled, rather than having
the internal discourse muted in favor of some outside group,
imposing its will. So I agree with Oliver that the cultural
points need to be developed a lot more. I do a little more of this
in the book, but that was. at most a beginning.
And the final observation that I'd make, I'm a tremendous
First Amendment advocate. Still, I think maybe some of Oliver
and my disagreement about whether the Canadian magazine
example was an example of strong or weak protectionism has
to do with our specific First Amendment theories. I emphasize
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that there's a notion of individual freedom that's important to
maintain people's capacity to participate and act as individu-
als. However, that is not the same as protecting multinational
conglomerates and corporations. The First Amendment per-
mits these to be subject to regulations, not to suppress content,
which would be strong protectionism, but to change the market
around. The permissible goal is not suppression but to restruc-
ture the market to produce a more useful and desirable mix of
media content.
I disagree with Jerome Barron's remarks also, other than
that I resist his pessimism but don't argue that it's not war-
ranted. A couple of points. My claim in favor of national power
to engage in some type of regulation of free trade doesn't mean
that it will be used sensibly. It's rather a claim that a nation
committed to its citizens, either the citizens' democratic or con-
sumptive interests, needs to maintain this power. It's analy-
gous to an argument in the copyright realm that a nation
should not alienate the authority to develop a copyright regime
that responds to the nation's specific needs. This view rejects
automatically standardizing on the basis of global rules that
suppress the possibility for national policy choices that might
be made more intelligently.
Copyright expansionists, the group that I think is taking the
wrong position, first try to win domestically. When they lose
domestically, which does not happen often, they go and get the
position implemented internationally, and then beat the do-
mestic decision-making over the head the necessity of following
international law. Thus, one reason for maintaining resistance
to a free trade regime is to allow for internal politics. Of
course, domestic politics may move in the wrong direction, as
Jerome correctly describes in respect to this country and ar-
guably to an extent in Canada.
The part of his last comment that I want to resist is his sug-
gestion that a nation's resistance to globalization may be at the
expense of local dialog. And he gave data to describe how that
may very well have occurred to some extent in Canada. In fact,
globalization is more likely to hurt local dialog and I think it's
occurred in this country to some extent.
Early in the Clinton administration, a report written during
the prior Bush administration was put out by the Department
of Commerce. The DOC said the U.S. should deregulate in lots
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of ways beyond what had already occurred. The reason? If we
don't, our ability to dominate the world in media products will
be hampered. In order to dominate the world in telecommuni-
cations, we need more concentrated media aiming at more
global markets. And so we should abandon local dialog. For
example, we should allow foreign ownership of broadcasting, in
our efforts to create the market conditions needed to support
our global dominance.
Free trade advocates argue that the result is not necessarily
U.S. dominance. Canada's response to U.S. prominence, or
French response to U.S. prominence, could be to avoid their
parochialism and thereby compete in the global market by
making their products more American. Essentially, what the
free trade advocates were saying to the Canadians or the
French is: why don't you make more Hollywood-like products.
Right. That's one response to globalization and it has a certain
type of economic logic.
My suggestion is that it's hard to tag all Canadians or all
Americans with the view that we should downplay local dis-
course, local dialog in favor of global media. Rather, those is-
sues are contested internally within the politics of Canada and
are contested internally in the politics of the United States.
My claim is that we should not allow the free trade regime to
short circuit those politics. My second claim is that, when that
occurs, the goal ought to be to produce a robust Canadian pub-
lic broadcasting system and, as Canadian media advocates
have sought, local media for various sub-groups in the Cana-
dian population. These are the policies that the Canadians
rightly see are threatened by globalization.
That is not the only way domestic politics could go. There
are Canadian interests that favor conglomerate Canadian me-
dia that will operate well in a free trade regime at whatever
cost to local discourse. That's perfectly possible. But better
alternatives are also possible and the choice should be fought
out domestically. What I fear is a free trade regime that will
short circuit the opportunities for that domestic debate.
PAUL SCHWARTZ: Great.... Thank you very much.
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